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De sacra militia contra iconomachos 
Civic Strategies to Counter Iconoclasm in the Low Countries (1566)1
ruben suykerbuyk
Although the iconoclastic scare must have been enormous and the actual impact of 
the attacks of summer and autumn 1566 can hardly be exaggerated, the Beeldenstorm 
was not as comprehensive as it seemed to contemporaries and subsequent 
historians. Indeed, a considerable number of important cities in the Habsburg 
Netherlands actually managed to ward off destruction, but until now their role 
has hardly been studied. The aim of this article is twofold: first, it seeks to chart 
the cities in question. Second, it analyses the preventive measures that they took 
against the violence. In so doing, it nuances the idea of the Beeldenstorm as an all-
destructive wave, and provides insights into the dynamics of the Iconoclastic Fury. 
More specifically, the cliché that the passivity of magistrates was the main reason 
for all losses seems in need of considerable revision.
De sacra militia contra iconomachos. Stedelijke maatregelen tegen de Beeldenstorm in de Lage 
Landen (1566)
Ondanks de reële iconoclastische dreiging en de enorme impact van de 
vernielingen in de zomer en herfst van 1566, was de Beeldenstorm niet zo grondig 
en alomvattend als ze door tijdgenoten en latere historici werd beschreven. Een 
aanzienlijk aantal belangrijke steden in verschillende gewesten van de Habsburgse 
Nederlanden wist inderdaad aan de vernielingen te ontsnappen, maar hun rol werd 
tot nu toe nauwelijks bestudeerd. Het doel van dit artikel is daarom tweeledig: 
enerzijds worden de steden in kwestie in kaart gebracht, anderzijds wordt 
onderzocht welke maatregelen zij namen ter preventie van het geweld. Naast het 
feit dat dit het idee van de Beeldenstorm als allesverwoestend sterk kan nuanceren, 
leidt het tot een aantal interessante inzichten in de precieze aard van de storm. 
Vooral het cliché van de niet-ingrijpende magistraat als belangrijkste reden voor de 
massale verliezen blijkt aanzienlijk herzien te moeten worden.
beeldenstorm: iconoclasm in the low countries
On Saturday 31 August 1566, in the midst of the iconoclastic upheaval that 
struck the Low Countries, Maximilien Morillon, the diligent informant of 
Cardinal Antoine Perrenot de Granvelle in Leuven, apologised for not being 
able to provide as much information as usual on the precarious situation in 
the Netherlands. ‘Je ne puis [...] sortir ceste ville que l’on tient close’, he wrote, 
‘qu’est cause que je n’ay moien de faire si ample advertence comme je polroie 
faire estant à Brucelles: mais le dangier y est trop grand’. At the same time, he 
expressed his gloomy prognosis for the future: ‘L’on tient icy assez bon ordre 
et grand guest: mais je craindz que, à la longue, les bourgeois se fascheront 
[...]’.2 Almost two months later however, after several weeks of ostentatious 
destruction in churches, chapels and cloisters all over the Habsburg 
Netherlands, Governess Margaret of Parma wrote the city of Leuven about 
[...] le contentement qu’elle (His Majesty, Philip II, R.S.) prend de veoir les bons 
offices et debvoirs que ses bons et loyaulx subiectz font pour eulx conserver 
et maintenir en leur ancienne devotion tant au regard de la religion que pour 
service de Sa Majesté. 
This letter, also sent to twelve other towns on 25 October 1566, contained 
further encouragement for the cities’ magistrates to keep up the good work 
and to remain alert for the ever-active and dangerous heretics.3 Indeed, unlike 
many other towns in the Netherlands, the cities that received this circular 
letter were eventually able to ward off the iconoclastic attacks in late August 
and September 1566. In the historiography of the Beeldenstorm however, there 
is a markedly uniform monolithic depiction of the events. By focusing on 
particular iconoclastic events and how the iconoclasts went about inflicting 
damage, this has created a distorted image of an all-encompassing destructive 
wave of violence. As Morillon’s letter suggests, the iconoclastic scare must 
indeed have been enormous all over the Low Countries and the actual impact 
of the attacks themselves can hardly be exaggerated. All the same, there are 
many more towns than the thirteen addressed by the governess that managed, 
1 The title refers to the heading of the 35th chapter 
in J. Molanus, Les quatorze livres sur l’histoire de 
la ville de Louvain (Brussels 1861) i, 442, narrating 
Leuven’s resistance. Research for this article was 
financed by the Research Foundation Flanders 
(fwo). I am very grateful to Susie Sutch for her 
wonderful help and to Hans Blomme for the 
cartography.
2 Correspondance du Cardinal de Granvelle, 1565-1586 
I.E. Poullet (ed.) (Brussels 1877) 438.
3 Brussels, State Archives of Belgium (hereafter 
ara), i 425, Audience, inv. 244/2, Correspondence 
September-December 1566, no. 126. It was 
sent to Leuven (Duchy of Brabant); Douai, 
Lille, Bruges, Aalst, Kortrijk and Dendermonde 
(County of Flanders); Gouda, Rotterdam and 
Dordrecht (County of Holland); Arras and 
Saint-Omer (County of Artois); and Mons 
(County of Hainaut). It is partially published in: 
Correspondance française de Marguerite d’Autriche, 
Duchesse de Parme, avec Philippe ii, iii, H.A. Enno 
van Gelder (ed.) (Utrecht 1942) 62.
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more or less, to maintain order in late 1566. Many of them were important 
economic, political or religious centres in the Low Countries.
So far, the attitudes of these cities during the Iconoclastic Fury have 
been scarcely studied by historians. At most, they have received an honourable 
mention in a survey, just stating that the magistrates acted firmly as a result of 
which there was no occurrence of damage.4 Notable and inspiring exceptions 
however, are Otto de Jong, who problematised the use of Antwerp as a 
textbook example for the 1566 events and pointed to the relative importance 
of untouched centres, and Robert DuPlessis, who called for attention to loyal 
cities and the issue of stability during the Dutch Revolt.5 By looking more 
closely at the strategies and measures of these cities, this contribution seeks to 
deepen our knowledge of the character and the precise nature of the Iconoclastic 
Fury of 1566 we now call the Beeldenstorm. Their qualification as cities is indeed 
important: all of the places studied possessed town privileges by 1566, including 
the right to construct ramparts. Thus, in contrast to villages, they were in a 
better position to protect themselves from attacks.6 While roughly mapping the 
cities that escaped the fury might nuance the idea of the Beeldenstorm as an all-
destructive fury, looking at the measures they took in a comparative perspective 
yields interesting insights into the contemporary image and perception of the 
events. More importantly, such an approach can counter the cliché that the 
passive magistrates were the main reason for all the losses.
Good, bad and borderline cases
A quick sketch of the geographical distribution of ‘untouched cities’ and their 
various degrees in importance is illustrative of the situation (see page 20). In 
4 Such is still the case in the most recent 
general survey on the subject: H. Kaptein, 
De Beeldenstorm (Hilversum 2002) 57.
5 O.J. de Jong, Beeldenstormen in de Nederlanden 
(Groningen 1964) 5; R. DuPlessis, Lille and 
the Dutch Revolt: Urban Stability in an Era of 
Revolution, 1500-1582 (Cambridge 1991) especially 
11-14, 313 and 320. See also A.C. Duke and 
D.H.A. Kolff, ‘The Time of Troubles in the County 
of Holland, 1566-1567’, Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis 
82:3 (1969) 323-324; P. Mack Crew, Calvinist 
Preaching and Iconoclasm in the Netherlands, 
1544-1569 (Cambridge 1978) 38; M. Hageman, Het 
kwade exempel van Gelre. De stad Nijmegen, de 
Beeldenstorm en de Raad van Beroerten, 1566-1568 
(Nijmegen 2005) especially 183-191; J. Pollmann, 
Catholic Identity and the Revolt of the Netherlands, 
1520-1635 (Oxford 2011) especially 70-71.
6 The only exception is The Hague, which however 
had every characteristic of a city. Duke and 
Kolff, ‘The Time’, 324, n. 63 also stressed the 
importance of the distinction between cities 
and the countryside. Examples of villages that 
claimed not to have suffered iconoclastic attacks 
are mentioned by G. Janssens, ‘Rapporten 
uit 1569 over herstelde schade aan kerken en 
kapellen in de Vlaamse westhoek. Een bron 
voor de geschiedenis van de eerste fase van de 
beeldenstorm van 1566’, in: J. De Zutter, L. Charles 
and A. Capiteyn (eds.), Qui valet ingenio. Liber 
amicorum aangeboden aan Dr. Johan Decavele 
(Ghent 1996) 281-282.
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the south-western provinces, where reputedly the most violent riots started, 
important towns that escaped the attacks included Aalst, Bruges, Douai, 
Kortrijk, Lille and Veurne in the County of Flanders and Saint-Omer in the 
County of Artois. In the Duchy of Brabant, both Brussels and Leuven were 
spared, while in the County of Holland Dordrecht, Gouda and Haarlem 
managed to maintain order. Finally, in the Duchy of Guelders, cities such as 
Arnhem, Nijmegen and Zutphen should be mentioned. Thus, in all three 
regions that Jozef Scheerder distinguished in his study, there were cities 
left untouched.7 The three cities mentioned in Holland, for example, were 
three of the six so-called chief towns in the County.8 In terms of inhabitants, 
three of the ten largest cities in the Low Countries, Brussels, Bruges and 
Lille, did not endure a Beeldenstorm in 1566.9 Indeed, Phyllis Mack Crew has 
already remarked that ‘the iconoclasm was not as thorough as it seemed to 
contemporaries’.10
Because of the somewhat problematic distinction between ‘touched’ 
and ‘untouched’ cities, and because of our occasional ignorance of what 
actually happened in certain places, it is difficult to provide a complete 
catalogue.11 All the same, the lists of cities that figure in the governess’s 
correspondence with the local authorities provide a helpful point of 
departure. While her letter of 25 October was sent to thirteen cities, three 
days later she sent a similar letter, this time addressed to seventeen cities. 
Interestingly, they were referred to in a caption as ‘les villes bonnes’.12 
‘Bonne’ does not refer to a special civic title with accompanying privileges 
here, but is explicitly used to indicate the cities’ loyalty to the King and the 
Catholic religion during the recent turmoil.13 They are opposed to ‘les villes 
mauvaises’: a later circular letter, containing more news from King Philip II 
for the local authorities and dated to 3 July 1567, was sent to 29 villes bonnes, as 
7 On the division into three regions, see J. 
Scheerder, De Beeldenstorm (Bussum 1974) 18.
8 J.J. Woltjer, ‘De Staten van Holland in het jaar van 
hagepreek en beeldenstorm’, in: M. Bruggeman 
et al. (eds.), Mensen van de nieuwe tijd. Een liber 
amicorum voor A.Th. van Deursen (Amsterdam 
1996) 50.
9 J. de Vries, European Urbanization 1500-1800 
(London 1984) 271-272, 280-281.
10 Mack Crew, Calvinist Preaching, 11, n. 27.
11 Duke and Kolff, ‘The Time’, 323.
12 Dated 28 October 1566, it was sent ‘aux villes 
bonnes, assavoir Bruxelles, Louvain, Bruges, 
Courtray, Arras, St Omer, Aire, Bethunes, 
Mons, Ath, Namur, Luxembourg, Lille, Douay, 
Tenremonde, Dordrecht, Alost’. The original 
is in Brussels, ara, i 425, Audience, inv. 241, 
Correspondence of Margaret of Parma, 5th 
March 1561-27 April 1567, ff. 141-142; published in 
Correspondance de Philippe ii sur les affaires des 
Pays-Bas (1558-1577) ii, L.P. Gachard (ed.) (Brussels 
1851) 596-597.
13 Compare for instance the letter of 13 September 
1566 from Margaret to Philip in Correspondance 
française de Marguerite d’Autriche, Duchesse de 
Parme, avec Philippe ii, i, H.A. Enno van Gelder 
(ed.) (Utrecht 1925) 159-160: ‘toutte la commune 
de ceste ville (que est pour la plus part bonne et 
catholicque)’.
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opposed to only 26 villes mauvaises.14 The latter had been infected with heresy, 
which might have included iconoclastic attacks, though not necessarily. The 
city of Nijmegen is a case in point: although it figures on the list as a ville 
mauvaise, strictly speaking it remained untouched by a real Iconoclastic Fury. 
Probably this negative categorisation was the consequence of the tolerant 
religious agreement the city announced on 1 September 1566.15 ‘Touched’ or 
‘untouched’ is indeed an a posteriori classification and in any case too black-
and-white a distinction that does not take into account certain borderline 
cases. It is revealing to recall the subtle, but apparently contemporary, 
difference between Iconoclastic Fury and iconoclasm Johannes Acquoy already 
pointed out in 1873. When interviewed by the commissioners of the Council 
of Troubles, several witnesses claimed that Zaltbommel was not hit by the 
Iconoclastic Fury (beeldtstorminghe), although they knew of one or two separate 
cases of iconoclasm (eenighe beeldebrekinghe).16 Similar isolated incidents are 
recorded in Nijmegen, but equally in Kortrijk and Dordrecht, two cities that 
both figured on the governess’s list of villes bonnes and other early lists of cities 
that ‘remained free of vandalism’.17
Consequently, some cities cannot be strictly categorised as either having 
been hit or not.18 The Hague is a case in point: as soon as the magistrates heard 
the news from Antwerp, they hired a number of workers to remove the images, 
in order to avoid pandemonium. Thus the iconoclasm probably took place in 
an orderly fashion, and as the magistracy demanded ‘in alderstillicheyt, sonder 
commocy’.19 More or less the same happened in Leeuwarden in the northern 
province of Friesland, while in Diksmuide in the southwest ‘strangers’ were 
said to have carried out the iconoclastic cleansing of the church, but under the 
supervision of the bailiff who made sure that the costly rood loft and sacrament 
14 Correspondance de Philippe ii, 634-636. Although 
I was unable to find the original, Gachard claims 
that the terminology is used explicitly in the 
captions. Another example of explicit use of 
the expression ‘villes mauvaises’ in connection 
with 22 local authorities is in Brussels, ara, i 425, 
Audience, inv. 241, Correspondence of Margaret 
of Parma, f. 182.
15 Hageman, Kwade exempel, 181-214.
16 J.G.R. Acquoy, Jan van Venray (Johannes Ceporinus) 
en de wording en vestiging der hervormde gemeente 
te Zalt-Bommel (’s-Hertogenbosch 1873) 47, n. 4. 
Zaltbommel was categorised as ville mauvaise: 
Correspondance de Philippe ii, 634.
17 For instance A. Wauters (ed.), Mémoires de Viglius 
et d’Hopperus sur le commencement des troubles des 
Pays-Bas (Brussels 1858) 346; A.L.E. Verheyden, 
‘Chronique de Pierre Gaiffier (1566-1568)’, Bulletin 
de la Commission Royale d’Histoire 119 (1954) 25 
and 34. On Nijmegen, see Hageman, Kwade 
exempel, 210-213. On 31 October 1567 someone 
is sentenced in Dordrecht for having vandalised 
statues, books and ornaments in the Grote Kerk. 
A similar judgment was pronounced on someone 
in Kortrijk in 1571. J. van Herwaarden et al., 
Geschiedenis van Dordrecht (Hilversum 1996) i, 359; 
J. Decavele, ‘Ketters en papisten in het Kortrijkse 
stadsbestuur (1561-1580)’, Handelingen der 
Maatschappij voor Geschiedenis en Oudheidkunde 
te Gent 49 (1995) 230, n. 32.
18 Duke and Kolff, ‘The Time’, 323.
19 Scheerder, Beeldenstorm, 76.
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house were spared.20 Furthermore, the abundance of local studies illustrates 
that the Beeldenstorm was not a homogenous movement that struck identically 
everywhere; instead it was highly heterogeneous and characterised by pluralism 
and particularism.21 Indeed, as Peter Arnade’s recent study aptly demonstrated 
for Antwerp, Ghent and Ypres, the motivations for and precise developments 
of the iconoclastic acts significantly differed locally.22 We may conclude that 
the reasons why certain cities resisted also differ and depend on various factors, 
and that consequently it is impossible to deduce one general principle that 
can explain why a number of towns were left untouched. Nevertheless, as the 
iconoclastic scare seems to have been omnipresent, they all felt threatened and 
consequently took measures. Interestingly, we can observe some recurring 
principles in their policies and the measures taken, which I will analyse in the 
remainder of this article. The point of departure for the survey is the lists of 
villes bonnes in the governess’s letters, for which I collected information from 
various source types, including municipal decree books and regional documents 
in the archives of the Council of Troubles, mostly the cities’ defences known 
as Mémoires justificatifs. I then cross-checked these official sources with a range 
of narrative sources, such as correspondence, chronicles and memoirs, which 
provide more details about the actual implementation of these measures.23
Civic jurisdiction
Contemporary Netherlandish sources are rather pessimistic about the 
resistance and remain silent about the measures taken. By contrast, these 
20 For Leeuwarden, see J.J. Woltjer, Friesland 
in Hervormingstijd (Leiden 1962) 151-152; for 
Diksmuide, see the testimonies in the Mémoire 
justificatif (Brussels, ara, Council of Troubles 
(hereafter ct), inv. 55, especially ff. 59-62).
21 Duke and Kolff, ‘The Time’, 322-323. See also the 
remarks in J. Roelink, ‘De Nederlandse Opstand een 
klassenstrijd?’, in: G.J.D. Aalders et al. (eds.), Kritisch 
kwintet. Historische opstellen (Amsterdam 1964) 53 
and 70; Scheerder, Beeldenstorm, 18 and 114.
22 P. Arnade, Beggars, Iconoclasts, and Civic Patriots: 
The Political Culture of the Dutch Revolt (Ithaca, ny 
2008) 125-165.
23 Investigations were limited to the three 
regions Scheerder treated, leaving out most 
of the provinces of Artois, Hainaut, Namur 
and Luxembourg. The situation in these areas 
is less studied, but in general they seem to 
have been less affected, as suggested by early 
narrative sources, such as Mémoires de Pontus 
Payen i, A. Henne (ed.) (Brussels 1860) 185-186; 
Correspondance du Cardinal de Granvelle,  
457-458; Mémoires de Viglius et d’Hopperus,  
345-346.
‘Villes bonnes’ in the circular letters of Margaret of Parma, 1566-1567. Ruben Suykerbuyk and Hans Blomme, based on 
the map in Geoffrey Parker, The Dutch Revolt (Ithaca, ny 1977).

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issues surprisingly received much more attention in Italian writings.24 
Giovanni Battista Guicciardini, sometime merchant in Brussels and informant 
for the Medici court, is one of the few authors who offered a succinct analysis 
of the resistance. He mentions three main reasons for the success of cities that 
remained intatto, such as Brussels and Leuven: the closing of the city gates, 
the organisation of a guard that patrolled day and night, and the providing 
of churches with armed watchmen.25 These are indeed the measures that 
also turn up in other sources. As for the first two, since the submission of the 
petition known as the Compromise of Nobles to Margaret of Parma on 5 April 
1566, tensions were already running high. As a result, cities such as Antwerp 
and Brussels for instance, had a permanent watch installed.26 In the summer 
months too, many cities closed a considerable number of their gates, which 
they equipped with extra sentinels. This was done for two complementary 
reasons.
First, by ‘sealing’ the city, the magistrates sought to prevent citizens 
from attending the sermons of hedge-preachers outside the city walls. On 1 
August inhabitants of Bruges who wanted to leave had to declare why, and 
from 9 August onwards the gates were not only monitored by guards, but also 
by members of the town council who advised against going to the open-air 
sermons and registered the names of those who went anyway.27 The city of 
Brussels too, decided to register names on 2 September, but on the 8th all the 
gates were closed so that no one could leave. A few days later, on the 14th, two 
gates were opened again, but attending the sermons was still prohibited.28 
The cities of Hoorn and Nijmegen are known to have reacted similarly.29
24 N. Lamal, ‘Nieuws en informatienetwerken. 
De Medici en het begin van de Opstand in de 
Nederlanden (1566)’, Handelingen van de Koninklijke 
Zuid-Nederlandse Maatschappij voor Taal- en 
Letterkunde en Geschiedenis 66 (2013) 75-76.
25 Lettere di Giovan Battista Guicciardini a Cosimo 
e Francesco de’ Medici, scritto dal Belgio dal 1559 
al 1577, M. Battistini (ed.) (Brussels, Rome 1949) 
267. The date of 2nd August 1566, suggested by 
Battistini, is evidently wrong, since the letter 
mentions the destruction suffered in Antwerp, 
which only started on 20 August.
26 Correspondance du Cardinal de Granvelle, 201-202; 
Lamal, ‘Nieuws’, 73.
27 See the Mémoire justificatif of the city of Bruges: 
Brussels, ara, ct, inv. 64, ff. 206-207v; published 
in full by A.C. De Schrevel, ‘Troubles réligieux du 
xvime siècle au quartier du Bruges 1566-1568’, 
Annales de la Société d’émulation pour l’étude de 
l’histoire et des antiquités de la Flandre 5:5 (1894). 
Compare with Correspondance du Cardinal de 
Granvelle, 424.
28 Brussels, Archives of the City of Brussels 
(hereafter sab), inv. 1724, Resolutieboek 1551-
1580, f. 101v-102. See also Verclaringhe opt 
beleth vanden nieuwen predicatien binnen ende 
omtrint der Stadt van Bruessele (Brussels, 18 
September 1566; copy in Ghent, University 
Library). Compare with Lettere di Giovan Battista 
Guicciardini, 274; Verheyden, ‘Chronique’, 34; 
Mémoires de Pontus Payen, 230-232; Dagboek van 
Jan de Pottre, 1549-1620, B. de St. Genois (ed.) 
(Ghent 1861) 22.
29 For Hoorn, see two testimonies in Brussels, ara, 
ct, inv. 109, f. 351-352 and 355v; for Nijmegen, see 
Hageman, Kwade exempel, 181-183.
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Second however, closing gates and mounting guards was done in order 
to keep a close watch on people coming in. As a reaction to public preaching 
being organised in the vicinity, on 5 July the city of Bruges decided to close all 
but two gates at night and to increase control so no strangers could intrude. 
On 27 July four of the seven gates were still shut, even during the daytime, 
and the very next day the number of guards was augmented. From 9 August 
onwards, the day before the riots started in Steenvoorde, no strangers, or 
armed people or crowds were allowed entry, and on the 17th artillery was 
installed at the city gates.30 By closing all but four gates Brussels adopted a 
similar policy on the 19th and on 3 September it was decided to increase the 
guards and allow only market-goers to enter.31 The city of Leuven, which sent 
its burgomaster and pensionary to Brussels on 21 September where they heard 
the quade tijdingen of Antwerp, likewise was advised by Viglius and Margaret of 
Parma to keep the city shut and deny entry to strangers. On 29 August all but 
two gates were closed.32 Documented examples of similar measures are legion 
for other cities.33 
In complicating the entrance to their jurisdiction, magistrates 
evidently focused on strangers and non-inhabitants. Indeed, they were often 
seen as the source of the troubles. For instance, Kortrijk’s annual August 
fair was cancelled, precisely because it would attract too many outsiders.34 
Similarly, William of Orange feared quelque trouble during the Antwerp 
Ommegang on 18 August, because ‘il y entreront beaucoup d’estrangiers’.35 
Thus, in many towns, the measures taken went further than only supervising 
the city gates and trying to deny them entrance. The city of Bruges decided 
to expel all newcomers of the last three months on 5 July, and while from 27 
July onwards beggars and vagabonds were denied entrance, non-inhabitants 
were asked where they came from and where they would be staying. Later 
in August, on the 20th, members of the city council went around the city 
inns to track down suspicious characters and the following day innkeepers 
were charged with the duty to report those who were lodging with them, 
30 Brussels, ara, ct, inv. 64, ff. 202v-209, passim. The 
hallegebod of 27 July is published in De Schrevel, 
‘Troubles’, 35-36, n. 1.
31 Brussels, sab, inv. 1724, Resolutieboek, ff. 99v and 
100v.
32 Leuven, City Archives (hereafter sal), inv. 299, 
Resoluties van de magistraat, ff. 250-256, passim.
33 For instance, Gouda, Kortrijk and Lille: C.C. 
Hibben, Gouda in Revolt: Particularism and 
Pacifism in the Revolt of the Netherlands 1572-1588 
(Utrecht 1983) 32; M. Backhouse, ‘Korte schets 
van de socio-ekonomische en religieuze situatie 
in Kortrijk tijdens de xvie eeuw (1500-1580)’, De 
Leiegouw 18:4 (1976) 431; DuPlessis, Lille, 216.
34 Backhouse, ‘Korte schets’, 431.
35 Letter of 14 August 1566 to Margaret of 
Parma. Correspondance de Guillaume le 
Taciturne, Prince d’Orange ii, L.P. Gachard (ed.) 
(Brussels 1850) 184-185. See also Antwerpsch 
Archievenblad, X.P. Génard (ed.) (Antwerpen 
1879) 343: ‘[...] want, zoe sy verstaen hadden, 
dieselve predicatien begonst waeren by 
vrempde ende vuytlandige [...]’.
beeldenstorm: iconoclasm in the low countries

Immediately after the main iconoclastic tensions a printed account of 
the Brussels’ magistracy’s policy on the permission of preaching was 
issued, which emphasised that no such public gatherings had occurred 
within the city. Verclaringhe opt Beleth vanden nieuwen Predicatien 
binnen ende omtrint der Stadt van Bruessele, Brussels (Michiel van 
Hamont) 18 September 1566.
University Library, Ghent University.
d
e sacra m
ilitia co
n
tra ico
n
o
m
ach
o
s
25
suykerbuyk
while suspected Walloon drapers were put under house arrest.36 Although 
no similar duty to report is documented for Brussels, the Council of Troubles 
later on prosecuted two innkeepers who, around mid-August 1566, allegedly 
gave lodging to some preachers and people who had come from Flanders to 
urge the Brussels citizens to smash their statues. Strangers were also banished 
from the city on 5 September.37 Again, comparable examples can be found in 
several other cities.38
The fact that these cities almost immediately focused on foreigners 
seems to indicate that according to contemporary perceptions the danger was 
mainly coming from outside. This ties in well with recurring observations that 
in many of the cities that underwent attacks, foreigners played an important 
role, in addition to the sometimes hired and paid iconoclasts.39 In their later 
Mémoires justificatifs for the Council of Troubles, cities were often quick to 
emphasise that none of their inhabitants were actually involved in any of the 
troubles.40 But of course this source type needs to be read cautiously and, 
generally, the actual events indeed seem to have been the result of an interplay 
between internal and external factors. The case of Haarlem exemplifies 
this very well. When news from Antwerp reached the city on 23 August, the 
authorities feared similar attacks and immediately convened the militia for a 
general meeting. On that day the latter declared themselves to be willing to 
co-operate, although not unanimously, and the firm conviction was expressed 
that the danger was indeed coming from the outside.41 The very next day, 
however, the militia changed their minds: though they were willing to keep 
out foreigners, they declared themselves hesitant to actually stop any possible 
iconoclastic acts, since they feared bloodshed between citizens and family.42
Civic militia
If uprisings of local citizens were indeed to be feared, hermetically sealing 
the city would not have been very helpful. A measure that seems to have 
been taken to counter the danger from the inside is the guarding of the 
36 Brussels, ara, ct, inv. 64, ff. 203, 210v; De 
Schrevel, ‘Troubles’, 35-36, n. 1 and 45-46, n. 1.
37 Brussels, ara, ct, inv. 38, ff. 67v and 71v; 
Correspondance du Cardinal de Granvelle, 451.
38 Including Lille (March 1566), Haarlem (23 August) 
and Nijmegen (26 August). DuPlessis, Lille, 216; 
W.P.J. Overmeer, De hervorming te Haarlem 
(Haarlem 1904) 25; Hageman, Kwade exempel, 191.
39 Scheerder, Beeldenstorm, passim; M. Backhouse, 
‘Beeldenstorm en Bosgeuzen in het Westkwartier 
(1566-1568)’, Handelingen Koninklijke Geschied- en 
Oudheidkundige Kring van Kortrijk 38 (1971) 92-93; 
S. Deyon and A. Lottin, Les casseurs de l’été 1566: 
L’iconoclasme dans le Nord (Paris 1981) 172-178; 
DuPlessis, Lille, 209-210.
40 Such as Bruges, Diksmuide and Hoorn. Brussels, 
ara, ct, respectively inv. 64, f. 205; inv. 55, f. 53; 
inv. 109, f. 362v.
41 Overmeer, Hervorming, 155.
42 J.J. Temminck, ‘Haarlem in 1566 en 1567’, Jaarboek 
Haerlem 1971 (Haarlem 1972) 76.
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churches and chapels in town. Although in Gouda Catholic rites were not 
abandoned, in September the Janskerk was provided with guards both inside 
and out, and the building was closed after the liturgical services.43 In other 
cities, including Haarlem and Hoorn, the main churches were completely 
closed for a certain time, as a result of which there were no services at all.44 
A well-documented example is the Church of Saints Michael and Gudula in 
Brussels. On 21 August, again as a reaction to the news of the destruction in 
Antwerp the day before, the Brussels magistracy decided to put watchmen 
in the church towers and all churchwardens were advised to stand guard 
in their churches themselves.45 Tensions were indeed running high, and 
a few days later, on 24 August, it was rumoured that a Calvinist preaching 
and the despoiling of the Church of Saints Michael and Gudula were being 
planned. According to Morillon, the destruction would have actually taken 
place that day if Nicolas tsHagen, lieutenant to the Brussels amman, had not 
intervened: the divine office was suspended, the building was closed and 
guards were stationed in and around the church.46 A week later, on Sunday 1 
September, the church was opened again for a limited number of services and 
under heavy protection, and the very next day the governess had a Te Deum 
sung to celebrate the birth of Infanta Isabella. This event was an occasion 
for the chronicler Pierre Gaiffier to express his amazement about the strict 
surveillance: 
Et estant fort étrange de veoir en ladite église harquebusiers à crocq et grand 
nombre de sauldars armez, tellement que à grande peine et difficulté pouvoit-
on avoir accèz en ladite église, sinon par estroict passage et l’ung après 
l’autre [...].47 
During the following days services still seem to have been held irregularly 
and the guards remained in place, and it was only on 15 October that the 
magistrates decided to officially reopen the church, however still with limited 
opening hours.48
Although military organisation appears crucial for implementing all 
these measures, there was a dire need for soldiers, most of whose payment 
43 Hibben, Gouda, 32. Compare with Lille and 
Nijmegen: DuPlessis, Lille, 216; Hageman, Kwade 
exempel, 210-211.
44 Temminck, ‘Haarlem’, 77 and 82; Brussels, ara, 
ct, inv. 109, f. 362v. Compare also with Bruges: 
Brussels, ara, ct, inv. 64, f. 212.
45 Brussels, sab, inv. 1724, Resolutieboek, f. 99v.
46 Leuven, sal, inv. 299, Resoluties, f. 254; Lettere di 
Giovan Battista Guicciardini, 272-273; Correspondance 
du Cardinal de Granvelle, 432 and 440.
47 Verheyden, ‘Chronique’, 31-32. On the re-opening 
of the church, see Dagboek van Jan de Pottre, 22; 
Correspondance du Cardinal de Granvelle, 448 
and 451.
48 Brussels, sab, inv. 1724, Resolutieboek, f. 106. 
Confirmed by letters of Viglius (7 September) 
and Morillon (15 September): C.P. Hoynck van 
Papendrecht (ed.), Vita Viglii ab aytta Zuichemi 
ab ipso Viglio scripta [...] (The Hague 1743) ii, 377; 
Correspondance du Cardinal de Granvelle, 462. 
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was far in arrears. Several cities urgently begged for troops, but the central 
government in Brussels was often unable to send any at all, or at best only 
a very few. This awkward situation is well-known for the city of Lille, for 
which the Governor Maximilian Vilain, Baron of Rassenghien, frequently 
sent letters to Margaret of Parma. Lying between Armentières and Tournai, 
Lille was located in the centre of a Protestant hotspot and as a consequence 
was suffering severe threats almost constantly, which made Rassenghien 
fear the worst. However few in number, Margaret sent as many troops as she 
could, and eventually Lille was able to ward off all violent threats.49 However 
this was not due only to the troops the governess sent. As a result of the 
precarious situation, which she doubtlessly realised, on 18 August Margaret 
of Parma suggested that Rassenghien recruit his own troops from the city’s 
inhabitants.50 Moreover, there is evidence for the sudden organisation of such 
temporary civic armies in various other towns as well. Yet, it is important to 
emphasise that this was certainly not an obvious solution, since Charles V had 
explicitly prohibited cities to raise armies of their own without governmental 
consent.51 Thus, in principle, these civic armies raised to counter iconoclastic 
threats all needed Margaret’s approval. Furthermore, cities needed to organise 
the funding of these temporary troops themselves. In Lille an army of 200 men 
was set up, half of which was subsidised by the chapter of St. Pierre, while the 
other half was paid by the magistracy, which levied taxes on wine in order to 
come up with the necessary funds.52 Similar temporary civic armies are well-
documented in Bruges, Brussels, Kortrijk, and Leuven and it is interesting to 
compare their formation and funding.53
In Bruges, preparations had already begun at the end of July. On the 
27th members of the magistracy went around the city to locate every possible 
candidate between 16 and 60 years old, among whom they subsequently 
chose 300 competent soldiers. The collection of funds caused some debate, 
but it was agreed that the city of Bruges, the Spanish nation as well as the 
Bruges clergy would contribute.54 By 19 August, this army of 300 souldartz 
was operational, but Egmont advised enlisting 200 more. The soldiers’ 
49 DuPlessis, Lille, 216-220.
50 Correspondance française de Marguerite d’Autriche, 
Duchesse de Parme, avec Philippe ii, ii, H.A. Enno 
van Gelder (ed.) (Utrecht 1941) 341.
51 J. De Bloys, G. Stalins and B. Van Zoomeren 
(eds.), Tweeden druck vanden eersten bouck der 
ordonnancien, statuten, edicten ende placcaerten [...] 
van Vlaendren (Ghent 1639) 728-729.
52 Deyon and Lottin, Casseurs, 167; DuPlessis, Lille, 223.
53 Mention is also made of ‘gens de guerre’ or 
‘mannen van wapenen’ in Veurne, see Brussels, 
ara, ct, inv. 55, ff. 108 and 111v.
54 L. Vandamme, ‘Het Calvinisme te Brugge in 
beweging (1560-1566)’, in: D. Van der Bauwhede 
et al. (eds.), Brugge in de Geuzentijd. Bijdragen tot 
de Geschiedenis van de Hervorming te Brugge en in 
het Brugse Vrije tijdens de 16de eeuw (Bruges 1982) 
109-111.
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monthly payment would amount to 6 guilders, and in their later Mémoire 
justificatif the magistrates stressed that in total it cost the city more than 
3,600 guilders a month.55 While Bruges had the approval of their governor, 
the city of Kortrijk was advised to put up an army of 30 to 40 hommes de guerre 
by Margaret herself. By 24 August 40 soldiers were indeed selected and they 
were each paid a similar sum of approximately six guilders.56 In Brussels, the 
recruitment of the civic army was organised after the governess attempted 
an escape from the royal residence to Mons. In the night of 22 to 23 August, 
she tried to get away, but not only was she advised against doing so by Viglius 
and the Knights of the Golden Fleece present at the court, she was also 
actually hindered by the Brussels magistracy. Though enraged, she conceded, 
but made Count Peter Ernst I von Mansfeld-Vorderort captain of the city 
and demanded that an army be recruited.57 The actual organisation of this 
impressive force only started in September, however. While Margaret herself 
would contribute 500 harquebusiers, it was decided that 1000 soldiers were 
to be enlisted and paid by the city. The governess’s troops entered the city 
on 7 September and by the 11th the recruitment of the other 1,000 soldiers 
was completed. However, their payment created some difficulties. Several 
times in October, the magistrates requested the governess advance the troops’ 
payments for two months, or otherwise allow them to levy taxes on wine, 
which unsurprisingly encountered some resistance. At the end of December 
a voluntary collection was still made for the funding, and only by the end of 
May 1567 were the troops gradually dismissed.58 Unfortunately, neither of 
the sources mentions their pay, but circumstantial evidence suggests that it 
55 De Schrevel, ‘Troubles’, 138-139; Brussels, ara, ct, 
inv. 64, ff. 211r-v. Compare with Correspondance 
française de Marguerite d’Autriche i, 150 and 160; 
Correspondance du Cardinal de Granvelle, 429.
56 Correspondance française de Marguerite d’Autriche 
i, 160 and ii, 339, 405-406. In his letter of 1 
September, the High Bailiff of Kortrijk claimed 
that in total the 40 soldiers, of whom 4 were 
paid double, cost 280 pounds of 40 groats. Since 
a pound of 40 groats equaled a guilder, that 
would amount to a payment of 6.36 guilders per 
soldier. In a civic account of 1565-1566 mention 
is made of the huge sum of 6831 Lb. 12 s. 6 
d.p. for maintaining soldiers. See F. De Potter, 
Geschiedenis der stad Kortrijk (Ghent 1873-1876) iv, 
106, n. 1.
57 Various narrations of the story: Leuven, sal, 
inv. 299, Resoluties, f. 252r-v; Procès criminels des 
Comtes d’Egmont, du Prince de Horne et autres 
seigneurs flamands [...] (Amsterdam 1753) ii, 477-
479; F.A.F.Th. Reiffenberch (ed.), Correspondance 
de Marguerite d’Autriche, duchesse de Parme, 
avec Philippe ii (Brussels 1842) 188-189 and 196-
197; Mémoires de Viglius et d’Hopperus, 187-188; 
Verheyden, ‘Chronique de Pierre Gaiffier’, 28.
58 Brussels, sab, inv. 1724, Resolutieboek, ff. 
99v-101v, 105 and 106v; Brussels, ara, ct, inv. 
38, f. 68r-v; Dagboek van Jan de Pottre, 24-25; A. 
Wauters, ‘Episodes de l’histoire de Bruxelles: 
Commencements des troubles de religion, 
sous Marguerite de Parme’, Trésor National 4 
(1842) 62-63. Compare with Correspondance du 
Cardinal de Granvelle, 448 and 451; Correspondance 
française de Marguerite d’Autriche i, 159-169. Both 
Guicciardini and Gaiffier give other details that 
are not confirmed by other sources. See Lettere di 
Giovan Battista Guicciardini, 274-275; Verheyden, 
‘Chronique’, 31.
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might have approximated Bruges’ and Kortrijk’s six guilders.59 In Leuven 
finally, the recruitment of 200 knechten also took off in early September, 
again with the consent of the governess.60 Here, however, the financial 
organisation does not seem to have created problems: from the outset it was 
agreed that both the city and the university would contribute an equal share. 
The necessary funds were brought together, supported by donations from 
‘good citizens’, among others, and on 10 September the men accepted were 
advanced one Philipsdaalder, while they were promised a monthly pay of five 
guilders.61
On the effectiveness of the measures taken
Perhaps somewhat too straightforwardly, Guicciardini states that the soldiers 
in Brussels and Leuven were paid so that they could not be corrupted by the 
Beggars, but it is very reasonable to assume that the pay indeed mattered.62 
On a monthly basis, the soldier’s average salary of six guilders approximated 
the wages of carpenters or mason’s labourers in Lier and Brussels for the same 
year.63 In a period with reputedly high unemployment rates, such wages must 
have had a considerable appeal. Yet, as the examples of Bruges and Brussels 
suggest, the financial organisation of these armies was not easy and some 
cities probably were not able to establish them at all, forcing these towns to 
set up an unpaid citizens’ guard. Furthermore, in several places the Catholic 
population took matters into their own hands in order to offer stubborn 
resistance to iconoclasts, whether on the instigation of the local authorities 
or not. A telling example is the town of Veurne. Although it closed its gates, a 
number of iconoclasts succeeded in entering and started to cause devastation, 
but the inhabitants quickly managed to drive them out.64 Less glorious, but 
apparently equally effective, was to chase the attacking iconoclasts away with 
59 On 7 September, the city planned to collect 
2,000 guilders to pay the soldiers half their salary 
straight away, which suggests a monthly pay of 
four guilders. However, on 30 October the city 
requested the governess finance one month’s 
pay, amounting to 7,500 guilders, suggesting a 
higher pay of 7.5 guilders. Brussels, sab, inv. 1724, 
Resolutieboek, ff. 101 and 106v.
60 Correspondance française de Marguerite 
d’Autriche i, 159.
61 One Philipsdaalder equalled 2.5 guilders, so for 
a short period the monthly pay approximated 
six guilders. Leuven, sal, inv. 299, Resoluties, ff. 
258v-262 and 264. Compare with Lettere di Giovan 
Battista Guicciardini, 274; Molanus, Quatorze 
livres i, 442 and ii, 885.
62 Lettere di Giovan Battista Guicciardini, 275.
63 Respectively 7.35 and 4.725 guilders. Calculations 
based on figures in the database of the Global Price 
and Income History Group (Davis, University of 
California), taking 21 working days a month. D. Jacks 
and L. Arroyo Abad, ‘Belgium Wages 1366-1603’ 
(2005), http://gpih.ucdavis.edu/ (2 October 2015).
64 Brussels, ara, ct, inv. 55, ff. 110-111; J. Scheerder, 
‘Le mouvement iconoclaste en 1566 fut-il 
spontané ou prémédité?’, Miscellanea Tornacensia: 
Mélanges d’Archéologie et d’Histoire 1 (1951) 300; 
Backhouse, Beeldenstorm, 82-83 and 100.
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dung, which the inhabitants of Hoorn used successfully.65 These examples 
illustrate the importance of the local dominance of the reform-minded for 
the Iconoclastic Fury to be effective: where they were not, they often had 
difficulties carrying out their plans. Quite logically, a correlation between the 
degree of success of rising Protestantism and iconoclasm has already been 
advanced by several scholars.66
However, this does not work both ways, and the reality was much 
less straightforward than that. In several of the villes bonnes reformed 
communities actually existed and the iconoclastic scare evoked in the many 
letters by Morillon and the governess, among others, were doubtlessly fed 
by real threats. The Calvinist congregation in Bruges for instance, massively 
and openly showed itself in public in spring 1566 and in Brussels too, the 
Calvinists were well organised by this ‘Wonder Year’. The example of the 
Church of Saints Michael and Gudula mentioned above is illustrative, but the 
report by Councillor Josse de Bracle made for the Council of Troubles gives 
plenty of other examples of threats expressed.67 As a result of many contacts 
with Protestant centres, the university town of Leuven also saw considerable 
support for reformed ideas. An important trial in 1543 counted 42 persons 
accused of Protestantism, and military security measures had to be taken 
during both the legal proceedings and executions.68 Finally, though slightly 
destabilised by 1566, the Calvinist community in Lille, was one of the first in 
the Netherlands, making it an important reformed centre.69 Furthermore, 
although varying locally, iconoclasm really could come completely from out 
of town. The example of Diksmuide already cited is a case in point. When the 
notorious minister Sebastiaan Matte sent a small army to the city, demanding 
that they be let in, the magistracy stubbornly refused: and although the 
population appears to have been predominantly Catholic, they feared bloody 
reprisals and put pressure on the magistrates to let them do their job. This 
65 Brussels, ara, ct, inv. 109, ff. 363-365. Other 
examples in Scheerder, Beeldenstorm, 20-21, 
35 and 51; Verheyden, ‘Chronique’, 5 and 24; 
DuPlessis, Lille, 210; J. Pollmann, ‘Countering 
the Reformation in France and the Netherlands: 
Clerical Leadership and Catholic Violence 1560-
1585’, Past & Present 190 (2006) 95.
66 Duke and Kolff, ‘The Time’, 324; Scheerder, 
Beeldenstorm, 58-59, 109-110.
67 On Bruges, see especially A. Dewitte, 
‘Chronologie van de reformatie te Brugge en 
in het Brugse Vrije (1485-1593)’, in: D. Van der 
Bauwhede et al. (eds.), Brugge in de Geuzentijd. 
Bijdragen tot de geschiedenis van de Hervorming te 
Brugge en in het Brugse Vrije tijdens de 16de eeuw 
(Bruges 1982) 39; Vandamme, ‘Het Calvinisme’, 
107. De Bracle’s report is in Brussels, ara, ct, inv. 
38, see especially ff. 14, 15, 16, 17v, 42, 73v, 85v. See 
also G. Marnef, ‘Het protestantisme te Brussel, 
ca. 1567-1585’, Tijdschrift voor Brusselse Geschiedenis 
1:1-2 (1984) 57-61.
68 R. Van Uytven, ‘Bijdrage tot de sociale 
geschiedenis van de Protestanten te Leuven in de 
eerste helft der xvie eeuw’, Mededelingen van de 
geschied- en oudheidkundige kring van Leuven en 
omgeving 3:1 (1963).
69 M.-P. Willems-Closset, ‘Le protestantisme à 
Lille jusqu’à la veille de la révolution des Pays-
Bas (1521-1565)’, Revue du Nord 52:205 (1970); 
Backhouse, Beeldenstorm, 64.
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indeed seems to have happened, but later on the magistrates explicitly 
declared that there had been no citizens involved.70
All this is indicative of the complex and heterogeneous character of 
the events in August and September 1566. Although a general survey of the 
steps taken by the cities that did suffer attacks is lacking, at first glance it is 
surprising to observe that quite a number of these cities nevertheless took 
similar measures as the ones described above. In Amsterdam for instance, 
the magistrates decided to close the city gates at several times in early August 
to prevent inhabitants from attending the hedge-sermons, and though in 
Antwerp and Ghent the gates were not closed, aldermen and dignitaries 
stationed themselves there to persuade the population not to go.71 In Ypres 
the magistracy ordered the gates be closed, but in fact this was not done 
hermetically so iconoclastic acts could be carried out.72 Besides, in their 
later Mémoires justificatifs various cities cited the poor condition of city walls, 
including Diksmuide, Ronse and Ghent, the latter’s ramparts having been 
gravely diminished by Charles V as stipulated in the Concessio Carolina.73
An intensified surveillance over strangers was also instituted in cities 
such as Breda, Antwerp and Oudenaarde, and in the latter two innkeepers 
were obliged to report the presence of strangers.74 On top of these measures, 
a number of towns actually tried to organise a system of defensive citizens’ 
guards. As a reaction to rumours that public preaching would be organised in 
town, Amsterdam worked out an emergency plan, but the militia did not agree, 
with the result that the government was powerless and iconoclastic attacks 
took place anyway. Interestingly, the very next day the burgomasters agreed to 
recruit 40 or 50 citizens who would be paid a ‘reasonable salary’.75 Something 
70 Brussels, ara, ct, inv. 55, see particularly 
ff. 49v-52v, 58-62. See also Scheerder, ‘Le 
mouvement’, 299-300; idem, Beeldenstorm, 27; 
Backhouse, Beeldenstorm, 99-100.
71 P. Scheltema, ‘Resolutiën der Amsterdamsche 
vroedschap, bij den aanvang van de openbare 
prediking der hervormden te Amsterdam’, 
Berigten van het Historisch Genootschap te Utrecht 
4:2 (1851) 60-64; Antwerpsch Archievenblad, 
X.P. Génard (ed.) (Antwerpen 1879) 341-344; M. 
Delmotte, ‘Het Calvinisme in de verschillende 
bevolkingslagen te Gent (1566-1567)’, Tijdschrift 
voor Geschiedenis 76 (1963) 147.
72 Scheerder, Beeldenstorm, 29-30; Arnade, Beggars, 
129-130.
73 For Diksmuide, see Brussels, ara, ct, inv. 55, f. 49. 
For Ronse, see Mémoire justificatif du magistrat de 
Renaix, H. Raepsaet (ed.) (Ghent 1853) 24 and 27. 
For Ghent, see Verslag van ’t Magistraet van Gent, 
nopens de godsdienstige beroerten aldaer [...],  
K. De Volkaersbeke (ed.) (Ghent 1850) 5, 12, 19 
and 25. On the relation between the Concessio 
Carolina and iconoclasm in Ghent, see also 
Arnade, Beggars, 151-152.
74 For Breda, see A.J.M. Beenakker, Breda in de eerste 
storm van de opstand. Van ketterij tot beeldenstorm 
(Tilburg 1971) 67-73. For Oudenaarde, see Mémoire 
justificatif du magistrat d’Audenarde, D.-J. Vander 
Meersch (ed.) (Ghent 1842) 19. For Antwerp, 
see Antwerp, City Archives (hereafter saa), 1563 
(Troebelen 1565-1567). Ordonnantie vanden wake, 
13 August 1566; Antwerpsch Archievenblad, X.P. 
Génard (ed.) (Antwerpen 1879) 341-345.
75 Scheltema, ‘Resolutiën’, 64-67; H. van Nierop, 
Beeldenstorm en burgerlijk verzet in Amsterdam 
1566-1567 (Nijmegen 1978) 29.
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similar happened in Ghent. On 21 July, Margaret of Parma suggested that 
Ghent reorganise its inhabitants ‘par compaignies et quartiers comme vous 
avez de coustume pour vostre garde et asseurance en temps dangereulx’.76 
The magistrates started their organisation, but soon met with resistance from 
numerous social groups. In vain they tried to establish guard patrols of citizens, 
but this met with little enthusiasm, not only because of reformed convictions, 
but also because of confessional neutrality or self-interest of the inhabitants. 
The day before the iconoclastic attacks started, the magistrates decided to 
recruit 600 soldiers, but they were only operative from the 25th, three days too 
late. Similar temporary militia were planned in Ypres, but finally they proved 
impossible to organise.77 Lastly, both Antwerp and Breda decreed an ordonnantie 
vanden wake by order of William of Orange. In Antwerp, this was based on the 
civic duty of the inhabitants, merchants included. The ordinance stipulated 
who and how many men must guard what and where they must gather, but 
unfortunately it is not clear to what extent this all was put into practice.78
In all probability, it was not clear to the civic governments what 
precisely would happen and how, and consequently it was difficult to 
predict which measures would be effective. The locally differing character 
of the Beeldenstorm further confirms this assessment. All these observations 
help to problematise the clichéd idea that in cities where the magistrates 
acted there was no iconoclasm. Of course, cities with a nearly complete 
Calvinist government, such as Valenciennes or Tournai, soon went over to 
iconoclasm: but this was not the case everywhere by any means, and although 
the magistracies played an important role and further research into their 
respective cohesion, religious convictions and functioning might shed 
additional light on why and whether they acted or not, their decisions were 
not always accepted with no problems, as is clearly illustrated in the case 
of Diksmuide for instance. Due to the absence of a strong central authority 
in the Low Countries, they all had to work out their own stance and policy 
themselves.79 Guicciardini repeatedly asserts that due to Madama the situation 
was under control in several places, but that was clearly too laudatory a 
judgment.80 Various cities asked the central government for help or advice, 
but what they got was generally some evasive answers or vague suggestions, in 
any case no particular orders. Telling is the example of Ghent. On 17 August, 
76 Verslag van ’t Magistraet van Gent, 95-97; 
Delmotte, ‘Het Calvinisme’, 146-147.
77 Extensively discussed in Delmotte, ‘Het 
Calvinisme’, respectively 148-153, 173, n. 5 and 155. 
Compare also with the letter of 21 August of the 
Ghent magistrates to their pensionary in Brussels: 
Verslag van ’t Magistraet van Gent, 134.
78 Beenakker, Breda, 67-73; Antwerp, saa, 1563, 
Troebelen (unnumbered; 7, 9 and 13 August 1566). 
Compare with Correspondance du Cardinal de 
Granvelle, 422.
79 Deyon and Lottin, Casseurs, 165-172; G. Parker, 
The Dutch Revolt (Ithaca, ny 1977) 79; Woltjer, ‘De 
Staten’, 54.
80 Lettere di Giovan Battista Guicciardini, 267, 274 and 
277-278.
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the day after the churches in Ypres had been attacked, the magistracy sent its 
pensionary Joos Borluut to Brussels to request assistance from both Margaret 
and Egmont. The letters Borluut sent to Ghent on the two subsequent days 
however, clearly state that neither of them had a remedy ‘om in eene zaeke zo 
subitelyck upcommende zo haestelick te voorsiene’.81
Conclusion
In their Mémoires justificatifs the magistrates of cities that underwent iconoclastic 
attacks later presented themselves as vulnerable and powerless, and although 
these self-justifying sources should be regarded with the necessary caution, 
there certainly is some truth to it. Peter Arnade quite aptly characterised them 
as ‘middle-of-the-road men in a sea of evangelical furor’.82 For Antwerp, it has 
been argued that by 1565-1566 Calvinism had grown so popular that it became 
impossible for the magistracy to intervene without potentially provoking social 
unrest in the city.83 The magistrates indeed depended on various social groups 
in their towns and on the willingness of the local population to cooperate. The 
example of Ghent has already been mentioned, but in Antwerp too, William 
of Orange noted the lack of respect of the citizens for the magistracy around 
mid-August.84 More precisely, since it was virtually impossible to receive 
military support from Brussels, the magistrates were almost completely 
dependent on the willingness of the civic militia. If they were willing to co-
operate, it was possible to ward off attacks, but if they refused the magistracy 
quickly found itself in a very awkward position.85 For example, in Amsterdam, 
’s-Hertogenbosch, as well as in Hulst, the city government wanted to act 
in response to the news of the fury that had reached neighbouring towns, 
but due to the unwillingness of the militia they were completely impotent, 
with the result that these cities were eventually all hit.86 While in Ghent the 
stance of the guilds was dubious and unreliable, in Antwerp and Ypres they 
straightforwardly refused to hinder the open-air preaching.87
Although the crisis of authority certainly was one of the causes of the 
precarious situation, and whether iconoclasm took place or not depended 
greatly on the reactions of local citizens, this article sheds light on the steps 
taken by the urban governments. In Bruges the militia were found willing 
to help, but nevertheless the city felt compelled to put up an extraordinary 
81 Verslag van ’t Magistraet van Gent, 119-129, quote 
on 122.
82 Arnade, Beggars, 132.
83 G. Marnef, Antwerpen in de tijd van de 
Reformatie. Ondergronds protestantisme in een 
handelsmetropool, 1550-1577 (Amsterdam, Antwerp 
1996) 119-124.
84 Correspondance de Guillaume le Taciturne, 195-196.
85 Duke and Kolff, ‘The Time’, 329 and 332; Parker, 
Dutch Revolt, 79.
86 Scheerder, Beeldenstorm, 65 and 69.
87 Delmotte, ‘Het Calvinisme’, 148-150 and 155-156.
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temporary civic army of 500 men, close a significant number of the city gates 
and keep a close eye on foreigners, indicating that the magistracy was not 
at ease at all.88 The same goes for Brussels and Leuven that, in spite of the 
presence of respectively the court and the Catholic university that in part 
might perhaps account for their escape, took action in order to leave nothing 
to chance. Indeed, the fact that all these measures were taken in the cities 
discussed in this article makes clear that the iconoclastic scare was real, and 
that they all, to a greater or lesser extent, suffered genuine threats. Looking 
back, it seems that they took the right decisions at the right time, which in the 
end awarded them congratulatory letters from the distant king. Yet some of 
the measures they took were also taken in other towns that did suffer attacks. 
These cities were dubbed mauvaise and some of them we still consider as 
having been struck by the Beeldenstorm, while in some cases the destruction or 
removals went on in a rather orderly manner and sometimes even under the 
watchful eye of the magistracy. Therefore it seems desirable to adopt a more 
flexible framework when we assess the 1566 Beeldenstorm, which certainly 
was no all-destructive wave, since important towns spread over the various 
Habsburg Netherlands did not proceed to iconoclasm. What happened 
where can better be understood if each case is scrutinised individually, rather 
than applying all-inclusive and a posteriori categories. A pluralist view with 
attention to particular tendencies in different localities allows us to get rid 
of these and shed light on the essential nuances between iconoclasm and 
Iconoclastic Fury, between touched and untouched. Thus it is possible to get a 
better understanding of what was at stake. 
In conclusion therefore, it should be emphasised that it is impossible 
to pinpoint one explanation for why the villes bonnes discussed in this 
article were able to escape the Beeldenstorm. Yet studying them by means of 
various source types has made two things clear. First, partially because of a 
perceived link between hedge-preaching and iconoclastic threats, there was a 
striking overall focus on strangers and unknown intruders. Through various 
measures, civic governments wanted to keep them out, which suggests that 
to some extent it was believed that they were the source of the troubles, and 
that consequently the Beeldenstorm came from out of town. Second, it is notable 
that some of the measures taken in the untouched cities to some extent were 
also put in practice in towns severely hit, which helps to nuance the assertion 
that if the magistrates acted nothing happened. In fact, they found themselves 
in very awkward positions between a moody population and an absent and 
indecisive central government that provided no specific orders or support. In 
the end, some cities proved to have taken the right decisions to ward off the 
threats, but in the final analysis even in the villes bonnes these brave attempts 
eventually appeared to have been in vain, when in later years many of the 
churches that were once saved were now purged for Protestant services.
88 Brussels, ara, ct, inv. 64, f. 207v.
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